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Abstract
This study examines the expectational stability of the rational expectations equi-
libria (REE) under alternative Taylor rules when trend inﬂation is non-zero. We ﬁnd
that when trend inﬂation is high, the REE is likely to be expectationally unstable.
This result holds true regardless of the nature of the data (such as contemporaneous
data, forecast, and lagged data) introduced in the Taylor rule. Our results suggest that
a high macroeconomic volatility during the period of high trend inﬂation can be well
explained by introducing the concept of expectational stability.
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Many of the monetary policy analyses based on the New Keynesian framework have ne-
glected the existence of non-zero trend inﬂation. However, several recent studies point out
that the introduction of non-zero trend inﬂation has profound implications for monetary
policy. Among them, Kiley (2007) and Ascari and Ropele (2009) introduce alternative
versions of Taylor rules into New Keynesian models with non-zero trend inﬂation. They
show that the so-called Taylor principle, which requires the central bank to adjust the
nominal interest rate more than one-for-one with the variations of the inﬂation rate, does
not necessarily guarantee the determinacy of the rational expectation equilibrium (REE)
when the level of trend inﬂation is positive. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) recently
argue that high trend inﬂation in the 1970s made the U.S. economy indeterminate even
though the Fed’s policy likely satisﬁed the Taylor principle during that period. This implies
that the central bank should carefully choose its policy rule coeﬃcients by recognizing the
relationship between the level of trend inﬂation and the determinacy of REE.
However, these studies assume that the economic agents have perfect knowledge of
macroeconomic structures and always form rational expectations. If we instead assume
that the agents only have imperfect knowledge and are learning about the structure of
the economy over time, then the determinacy of REE is not the sole requirement for the
central bank. Bullard and Mitra (2002) propose the expectational stability (E-stability) of
REE, which ensures convergence of expectations to the REE under the standard learning
algorithm, as another requirement for monetary policy rules. They show the parameter
regions that satisfy the E-stability conditions as well as the determinacy conditions under
alternative versions of Taylor rules. Their main ﬁnding is that the relationship between
determinacy and E-stability depends on the version of policy rule being used. However,
their study focuses on a relatively speciﬁc environment in which trend inﬂation is exactly
equal to zero. It is still unclear how the introduction of non-zero trend inﬂation will aﬀect
their results.
In this study, we attempt to obtain the E-stability (as well as determinacy) conditions of
REE, taking into account the presence of non-zero trend inﬂation. Several previous studies
show that the introduction of non-zero trend inﬂation makes ﬁrms’ pricing behavior more
forward-looking compared to the case of zero trend inﬂation.1 As a result, the rate of
current inﬂation is inevitably aﬀected by long-horizon inﬂation forecasts. This is the only,
but important, departure from the study of Bullard and Mitra (2002).
Our analysis ﬁnds that when the level of trend inﬂation is high, the REE is likely
to be E-unstable. This result holds true regardless of the nature of the data (such as
contemporaneous data, forecast, and lagged data) used in the Taylor rule. We also show
1See, for example, Ascari (2004), Ascari and Ropele (2007), Sbordone (2007) and Cogley and Sbordone
(2008).
1that while the availability of current economic data in the conduct of monetary policy is
a key to E-stability as well as REE determinacy in a low inﬂation environment, this is not
necesarily the case in a high inﬂation environment.
Our results on E-stability conditions appear to be parallel with Ascari and Ropele’s
(2009) ﬁnding on determinacy conditions. However, there is an important diﬀerence. Ascari
and Ropele (2009) show that in the case of the lagged-data rule, a rise in trend inﬂation
does not necessarily narrow the determinacy region because the central bank can easily
attain determinacy by responding strongly to the lagged output gap. In contrast, our
study ﬁnds that higher trend inﬂation under the lagged rule makes the REE more likely
to be E-unstable even if it is determinate. This means that high trend inﬂation is more
robustly undesirable in terms of E-stability than determinacy. Therefore, the introduction
of a learning mechanism can provide a better explanation for the well-established positive
relationship between high trend inﬂation and macroeconomic instability.2
2 The model
2.1 A New Keynesian model under non-zero trend inﬂation
Some previous studies, such as Kiley (2007), Sbordone (2007), Cogley and Sbordone (2008)
and Ascari and Ropele (2007, 2009), provide alternative expressions of New Keynesian
models under non-zero trend inﬂation. Our model is based on that of Sbordone (2007) and
of Cogley and Sbordone (2008), which is given as follows:
yt = ye
t+1 − σ(it − πe
t+1 − rn
t ), (1)










t−1 + εt. (3)
πt is the percentage deviation of inﬂation from the (possibly non-zero) rate of trend in-
ﬂation, which is assumed to be constant. yt, it and rn
t are the output gap, the nominal
interest rate and the natural rate of real interest, respectively.3 For an arbitrary variable
2Our study is closely related to Kurozumi (2011), who also investigates the E-stability of REE in a sticky
price model with positive trend inﬂation. However, our analysis is distinct from his work mainly in two
respects. First, we analyze the E-stability of REE under alternative versions (such as forward and lagged
versions) of Taylor rules, although Kurozumi (2011) only examines the case under the contemporaneous
Taylor rule. Second, since deﬂation has become a pressing concern in major developed countries, we
investigate the case of negative (as well as positive) trend inﬂation, although Kurozumi (2011) focuses on
the case of positive trend inﬂation.
3Preston (2005, 2006) argues that if adaptive learning is introduced for the process of agents’ expectation
formations, structural equations determining the output gap and inﬂation rate should involve long-horizon
forecasts even when trend inﬂation does not exist. However, Honkapohja (2003) and Honkapohja, Mitra
and Evans (2002) point out that bounded rationality itself does not call for long-horizon forecasts. They
2x, xe denotes the expectations of variable x. The technical reason for the deviation from
the standard NKPC is that here log-linearization is done around a non-zero value of steady
state inﬂation while steady state inﬂation is assumed to be zero in the standard model.
Intuitively, if trend inﬂation is positive, ﬁrms try to internalize the inﬂuence of unavoidable
relative price erosion in setting current prices. Thus, goods prices under non-zero trend
inﬂation contain more information about the future compared to the case of zero trend
inﬂation. As a result, long-horizon forecasts emerge in the third term of (2), and thus the
parameters κ, b1, b2 and φ1 are aﬀected by the level of trend inﬂation.45
To see how non-zero trend inﬂation inﬂuences ﬁrms’ forward-lookingness, it would be
useful to check how the values of b1 and b2 vary with the level of trend inﬂation. Following
Sbordone (2007) and Cogley and Sbordone (2008), we set the benchmark parameter values
as follows: α = .588, θ =9 .8, ω = .429, ˜ ω = .63, β = .99, and σ =6 .25.6 With
this parameterization, (b1,b 2) takes the values of (.968,−.009), (.99,0), (1.033,.017), and
(1.073,.032) for the rate of (annualized) trend inﬂation -1%, 0%, 2%, 4%, respectively.
Under zero trend inﬂation, the model reduces to the standard model (b1 = β and b2 = 0).
However, in other cases, the model departs from the standard one. Furthermore, at least
within these numerical examples, the sum of coeﬃcients on inﬂation expectations increases
with the level of trend inﬂation. A rise in trend inﬂation also weakens the inﬂuence of the
current output gap on current inﬂation: κ takes the value of .039, .035, .029 and .023 for
the rate of (annualized) trend inﬂation -1%, 0%, 2%, 4%, respectively.
As for monetary policy rules, we introduce some versions of Taylor rules in which the
central bank responds to (i) the contemporaneous data (yt, πt), (ii) the forecast (ye
t+1,
insist that the structural equations with one-period-ahead forecasts are still valid as long as agents have
identical subjective expectations.
4Cogley and Sbordone (2008) derive the parameters as follows: φ1 = αβΠ
(θ−1)







(θ−1) ,b 1 = (1 + (1 + ω)θχ)φ2 − (θ − 1)χφ1,b 2 =( θ − 1)χ(φ2 − φ1),κ=˜ ωχ(1 − φ2), where α
is the probability of not changing prices, β is the discount factor, θ is the elasticity of substitution among
diﬀerent goods, ω is the elasticity of real marginal cost to its own output, ˜ ω is the elasticity of real marginal
cost to the aggregate output and Π is the trend inﬂation in gross term.
5The original AS equation used by Cogley and Sbordone (2008, eq.8) also includes two additional terms:
one is the term that depends on long-horizon forecasts of the output gap, and the other on past inﬂation.
However, they report that the degree of price indexation is statistically not diﬀerent from zero, and the
estimated coeﬃcient on the long-horizon forecasts of the output gap is at most 5×10
−3 over the whole sample
period (1960Q1:2003Q4). On that ground, we employ a simpler AS equation, and given the irrelevancy of
those terms, our model is essentially the same as the one used by Ascari and Ropele (2007, 2009). Note
that the model is exactly the same as the original one as long as log-utility is assumed. However, we also
examined the case of a more general CRRA utility function, in which case long-horizon forecasts of the
output gap need to be added. We nevertheless found that the main results of this paper do no change. The
details are shown in the supplementary appendix, which is available from the authors upon request.
6Throughout this analysis, φ1 > 0 is assumed to be less than one. This implies that annual trend
inﬂation must be less than 27.9% under our benchmark parameter values.
3πe
t+1), and (iii) the lagged data (yt−1, πt−1). The policy rule is generally given as
it = FlXt−1 + FcXt + FfXe
t+1 (4)
where Xt =[ yt πt] , Fi =[ Fiy Fiπ] for i = c,f,l. c, f and l represent the contemporaneous
rule, the forecast-based rule, and the lagged-based rule, respectively.7
2.2 Rational expectations
Under rational expectations, the AS equation (2) can be made simpler by using an auxiliary
variable ht:





This treatment is valid when the economic agents know the functional forms and parameters
of the structural equations. However, if we assume that the agents do not have complete
knowledge of the functional forms and parameters, then the agents cannot use the auxiliary
variable to compute inﬂation expectations. Therefore, we need to employ the AS equation
with long-horizon forecasts when examining expectational stability.
Under the contemporaneous rule or the forecast-based rule, the structure of the model
under RE can be written as
G ¯ Xt = H ¯ Xe
t+1 + Jrn
t ,
where ¯ Xt =[ yt,π t,h t]  and G, H and J are the matrices of coeﬃcients. The minimal state
variable (MSV) solution is given as
¯ Xt = Drern
t .
The method of undetermined coeﬃcients yields
Dre =[ I − ρrG−1H]−1G−1J.
If this is the only possible solution attained under RE, then the REE is said to be deter-
minate. On the other hand, if sunspots or self-fulﬁlling expectations can determine the
equilibrium, then the solution does not necessarily take the MSV form and the REE is
indeterminate.
7As for the forecast-based rule, we assume that the central bank and private agents make identical
forecasts. Honkapohja and Mitra (2005) and Muto (2011) introduce alternative setups in which the central
bank and private agents make heterogeneous forecasts or one of their forecasts is inﬂuential to the other,
although they assume that trend inﬂation is zero.
42.3 Adaptive learning
We now assume that agents are boundedly rational and that they are engaged in adaptive
learning. Following the literature (e.g., Evans and Honkapohja, 2001), we assume that
agents estimate their perceived law of motions (PLM), which takes the MSV form, by
recursive least squares (RLS) with decreasing gain. The actual law of motions (ALM) are
obtained by replacing the expectation terms in the structural model with the ones derived
from the PLM. The mapping function, which maps PLM into ALM, is called “T-map” and
the ﬁxed point of the T-map constitutes the REE. The E-stability is deﬁned as the local
asymptotic stability of a REE under the learning mechanism. The REE is E-stable if all
eigenvalues of the Jacobian of the T-map have real parts less than one. The “E-stability
principle” advocated by Evans and Honkapohja (2001) states that if agents use RLS with
decreasing gain and their information set remains bounded, then the E-stability guarantees
that the economy eventually converges to the REE. As Bullard and Mitra (2002) argue,
E-stability can be viewed as a minimum criterion for evaluating monetary policy rules.
2.3.1 The contemporaneous and the forecast-based rules
Under the contemporaneous and the forecast-based rules, the PLM is given as
Xt = A + Drn
t , (5)







t+j =( 1− φ1)−1φ1A +( 1− φ1ρr)−1φ1ρ2
rDrn
t . (6)
The structural equations can be reformulated as
QXt = WXe




































8Following previous studies, it is assumed that agents know the value of ρr. This assumption is innocuous
since agents can easily estimate the value by regressing (3) and this estimation process does not aﬀect the
E-stability of REE.
5By inserting (4), (5) and (6) into (7), we can obtain the actual law of motion (ALM):
Xt =( Q − NFc)−1{[W + NFf +( 1− φ1)−1φ1M]A
+[(W + NFf +( 1− φ1ρr)−1φ1ρrM)ρrD + U]rn
t }. (8)
The T-maps from the PLM to the ALM are then given as
T(A)=( Q − NFc)−1[W + NFf +( 1− φ1)−1φ1M]A (9)
T(D)=( Q − NFc)−1[(W + NFf +( 1− φ1ρr)−1φ1ρrM)ρrD + U]. (10)











The E-stability of the REE can be attained if and only if all of the eigenvalues of DTA( ¯ A)
and DTD( ¯ D) have real parts less than one.9
2.3.2 The lagged-data rule
Under the rule based on lagged data, it is implicitly assumed that the central bank and
private agents do not have current economic data. McCallum (1999) argues that poli-
cymakers are practically unable to obtain the data on contemporaneous macroeconomic
variables, such as inﬂation and output, in making their policy decisions. In this situation
it is natural to consider that private agents also do not have information about current
economic data.10 Under RE, the model can be expressed as
˜ G ¯ Xt = ˜ H ¯ Xe
t+1 + K ¯ Xt−1 + Jrn
t .
The MSV solution is given as
¯ Xt = Cre ¯ Xt−1 + Drern
t−1 + Ereεt.
The method of undetermined coeﬃcients yields the following three conditions:
Cre = ˜ G−1[ ˜ HC2
re + K]
Dre =[ I − ˜ G−1 ˜ H(Cre + ρrI)]−1ρr ˜ G−1J
Ere = G−1J.
9We ﬁnd that the E-stability condition is generally stipulated by four inequalities, and which one is
relevant depends on the level of trend inﬂation and other parameter values. Since the relevant inequality
condition varies with the level of trend inﬂation in a non-proportional way, we report numerical results here.
Analytical expression of the generalized E-stability conditions is shown in the supplementary appendix.
10Bullard and Mitra (2002) also assume this type of informational symmetry. If we instead assume that
only private agents can use the contemporaneous data, the E-stability region coincides with the determinacy
region. However, we consider this assumption practically implausible.
6As is noted by Bullard and Mitra (2002), the coeﬃcient matrix on the lagged vector, Cre,
is a solution of a matrix quadratic.
We express the PLM under the lagged-data rule as follows:
Xt = A + CXt−1 + Drn
t−1 + Q−1Uεt. (11)
The coeﬃcient on εt is assumed to be the same as that under ALM. This speciﬁcation is
innocuous because expectations are formed at t − 1.11 It follows that
Xe
t+1 =( I + C)A + C2Xt−1 +( C + ρrI)Drn
t−1
Xe










t+j =( 1 − φ1)−1φ1[I + C +( I − φ1C)−1C2]A
+(I − φ1C)−1φ1C3Xt−1
+(I − φ1C)−1φ1[C(C + ρrI)+( 1− φ1ρr)−1ρ2I]Drn
t−1
= ˜ A + ˜ CXt−1 + ˜ Drn
t−1.
The ALM can then be written as
Xt = Q−1{W(I + C)A + M ˜ A +( WC2 + M ˜ C + NFl)Xt−1
+[W(C + ρrI)D + ρrU + M ˜ D]rn
t−1 + Uεt}. (12)
The T-maps from the PLM to the ALM are then given as
T(A)=Q−1[W(I + C)A + M ˜ A], (13)
T(C)=Q−1(WC2 + M ˜ C + NFl), (14)
T(D)=Q−1[W(C + ρrI)D + ρrU + M ˜ D]. (15)
The E-stability conditions are that all of the eigenvalues of DTA( ¯ A, ¯ C), DTC( ¯ C) and
DTD( ¯ C, ¯ D) have real parts less than one.
3 The E-stability conditions under non-zero trend inﬂation
The combinations of the Taylor rule coeﬃcients, Fiπ and Fiy, i = c,f,l, that ensure E-
stability and determinacy of the REE are presented in Figures 1, 2 and 3. In all ﬁgures,
the upper-right panel corresponds to the case of zero trend inﬂation, which is equivalent to
11Bullard and Mitra (2002) use the same speciﬁcation of PLM.
7the situation analyzed by Bullard and Mitra (2002). The other panels show the E-stable
and determinate regions under non-zero trend inﬂation. Although the determinate regions
(except for the case of negative trend inﬂation) are essentially the same as those presented
by Ascari and Ropele (2009), the E-stable regions are novel contribution of our study.
Our main ﬁnding is that under all speciﬁcations of the rule, higher trend inﬂation makes
the REE more likely to be E-unstable: the E-stable region always shrinks as the rate of
trend inﬂation increases. This is in contrast to the case of determinacy since higher trend
inﬂation does not necessarily make the REE more likely to be indeterminate. Under the
contemporaneous rule the E-stable region corresponds exactly to the determinate region,
while the E-stable region is broader than the determinate region under the forecast-based
rule. With these two rules, both the determinate region and E-stable region shrink as the
rate of trend inﬂation increases.12
Under the lagged-data rule, however, things are diﬀerent. There exists a region in which
the REE is determinate but E-unstable, as shown by Bullard and Mitra (2002). Figure
3 shows that this region is broader for higher trend inﬂation. When the level of trend
inﬂation is high, the central bank can easily achieve determinacy by responding strongly
to the output gap. However, our results show that this kind of policy action fails to make
the REE E-stable. The REE under the lagged-data rule is more likely to be E-unstable
when trend inﬂation is high even if it is determinate.
Under RE, the introduction of lagged variables in the policy rule causes two kinds of
eﬀects. First, the REE becomes more likely to be explosive since additional state vari-
ables require more stable roots to obtain a non-explosive solution. Second, indeterminacy
becomes less likely to arise since the lagged variables make the equilibrium more history
dependent. The upper-right panel of Figure 3 reveals that, when trend inﬂation is zero, the
REE is likely to be explosive or determinate as long as the response to the output, Fly, are
not very small. As the level of trend inﬂation increases, the determinate and non-explosive
region enlarges. This is because ﬁrms become more forward-looking and the lagged vari-
ables become less inﬂuential. Although the likelihood of indeterminacy also increases, as in
the case of alternative rules, for a small value of Fly, our numerical exercise suggests that
this eﬀect is relatively minor under the lagged rule. The central bank can easily guarantee
determinacy by strongly responding to the lagged variables.
However, since higher trend inﬂation strengthens ﬁrms’ forward-lookingness, it is likely
that agents’ learning makes the REE E-unstable. In our numerical exercises, the sum of
coeﬃcients on inﬂation expectations (b1 and b2 in (2)) exceeds unity when trend inﬂation
is relatively high (such as 2% or 4%). Thus, there arises a negative relationship between
12Following Bullard and Mitra (2002), we also examined the policy rule based on contemporaneous
expectations: it = FpX
e
t . The analysis reconﬁrms their original result that the E-stability and determinacy
regions are exactly the same as those under the contemporaneous rule. The details are shown in the
supplementary appendix.
8output and inﬂation in the long run. This implies that an upward deviation of inﬂation
expectation from the RE value will push down the output gap. If the central bank lowers the
nominal interest rate in response to the fall in the output gap, then inﬂation expectations
rise further. This suggests that the equilibrium under adaptive learning may not converge
to the REE even if it is determinate.
Next, let us focus on the case of negative trend inﬂation. Under contemporaneous and
forecast-based rules, the determinate and E-stable region is broader when trend inﬂation
is negative rather than positive. Therefore, the REE is less likely to be indeterminate or
E-unstable in a deﬂationary environment. This result has an important policy implication
for low inﬂation countries. When trend inﬂation is very low, the degree of freedom for the
central bank to control the nominal interest rate is inevitably small due to the presence of
the zero lower bound (ZLB). Fortunately, our result indicates that the REE is more likely
to be E-stable and determinate for lower trend inﬂation. This implies that the necessity of
cutting interest rates against downward shocks will to some extent be removed. This will
mitigate the fear of ZLB that the central banks have in an era of very low inﬂation.
Our analysis also shows that the availability of current economic data for the central
bank is especially important in a low inﬂation environment because, when trend inﬂation is
very low, the E-stable region is much broader under the contemporaneous rule than under
the lagged-data rule. However, in a high inﬂation environment, the E-stable regions are
similarly narrow under all versions of Taylor rules. The central bank’s usage of current
economic data does not help much to ensure the E-stability of the REE. In this sense,
higher trend inﬂation is very likely to be associated with higher macroeconomic volatility.
4 Concluding remarks
Our analysis has shown that higher trend inﬂation tends to make the REE E-unstable under
various speciﬁcations of the Taylor rule. This result holds true regardless of the nature of
the data employed in the Taylor rule. Although the availability of current economic data
for the central bank helps to guarantee the expectational stability of REE in a low inﬂation
environment, this is not necessarily the case in a high inﬂation environment.
Our results provide a plausible explanation about why macroeconomic variables tend to
be quite volatile in a high inﬂation environment. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) argue
that the US economy was quite volatile in the 1970s because high trend inﬂation caused the
indeterminacy of the REE. Although this is an intriguing explanation, their argument is
sensitive to the data employed by the Fed. In the case of a lagged-data rule, the determinacy
region is quite broad even in a high inﬂation environment. In contrast, higher trend inﬂation
always narrows the E-stable region under all versions of the Taylor rule. Therefore, the
positive relationship between the level of trend inﬂation and macroeconomic volatility is
better explained by introducing the concept of E-stability as opposed to determinacy.
9Finally, our main results also have an important implication for the recent dispute on
whether the level of inﬂation targets should be set well above zero. Based on the recent
experience of the global ﬁnancial crisis, Blanchard et al. (2010) raised the issue of whether
the central bank should aim for a higher inﬂation target, such as 4%, in normal times in
order to avoid ZLB. Our results may provide a negative answer to this question. A rise in
the level of trend inﬂation will change the price-setting behavior of ﬁrms in a way that a
violation of the E-stability condition becomes more likely. To investigate this issue more
formally, however, the inﬂuence of ZLB should be explicitly taken into account. This issue
should be left for future research.
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Figure 3: The E-stability and determinacy regions under the lagged-data rule
13Supplementary appendix
A The full NKPC under non-zero trend inﬂation
In Cogley and Sbordone (2008, AER), the full version of the NKPC is given as










1(qt+j,t+j+1 +˜ yt+j+1 − ˜ yt+j), (A.1)
where ˜ yt and qt+j,t+j+1 denote the (logged) level of output and the real stochastic
discount factor, respectively.1 The degree of price indexation is set at 0. Here, suppose
that the utility function is given by the CRRA form: U(Ct)=C1−σ−1
t /(1 − σ−1). The






1(qt+j,t+j+1 +˜ yt+j+1 − ˜ yt+j)=b3(1 − σ−1)Et[(˜ yt+1 − ˜ yt)+φ1(˜ yt+2 − ˜ yt+1)
+φ2
1(˜ yt+3 − ˜ yt+2)+...]. (A.2)
Recall that in obtaining the IS equation (1), we deﬁned the natural rate of interest as
rn
t ≡ σ−1(Et˜ yn
t+1 − ˜ yn
t ), where ˜ yn
t stands for the natural rate of output. Using this
deﬁnition, (A.2) can be rewritten as
b3(1 − σ−1)Et[(yt+1 − yt +˜ yn
t+1 − ˜ yn
t )+φ1(yt+2 − yt+1 +˜ yn
t+2 − ˜ yn
t+1)+...]
= b3(1 − σ−1)[(ye





= b3(1 − σ−1)[ye























t+j, the above equation leads to
b3(1 − σ−1)[(1 − φ1)ye



















t+j +( 1− σ−1)b3(1 − φ1)ye
t+1











where we used the relation mct =˜ ωyt. This generalized NKPC and the IS equation can
be summarized in a way consistent with eq.(7):
QXt = WXe



































b3(1 − σ−1)(1 − φ1) ˜ b2φ1

,
where κ = ζ˜ ω.
Therefore, we can reexamine all the E-stability analyses done in the main text just by
redeﬁning the coeﬃcient matrices. It should be noted that this generalized version is
exactly the same as eq.(7) if we assume b3 =0o rσ =1 .
Under our benchmark parameter values, b3 = -.001, .002, and .004 when annual trend
inﬂation is -1%, 2%, and 4%, respectively. Figures 4 - 7, shown at the end of this
appendix, suggest that introducing an additional term in the NKPC does not change the
result because those ﬁgures are virtually identical to the corresponding ones shown in the
main text.
B The contemporaneous expectations rule




where expectations are formed at t − 1.
Following Bullard and Mitra (2002), the PLM is assumed to be given as
Xt = At−1 + Dt−1rn
t−1. (B.2)







t+j =( 1− φ1)−1φ1At−1 +( 1− φ1ρr)−1φ1ρ2
rDt−1rn
t−1.
By deﬁning Fp =[ Fpy,F pπ], the ALM leads to








Xt = Q−1{(W + NFp +( 1− φ1)−1φ1M)At−1
+[WρrDt−1 + NFpDt−1 + ρrU +( 1− φ1ρr)−1φ1Mρ2
rDt−1]rn
t−1 + Uεt}.(B.4)
15The T-maps are given by
T(At−1)=Q−1(W + NFp +( 1− φ1)−1φ1M)At−1 (B.5)
T(Dt−1)=Q−1{[Wρr + NFp + φ1(1 − φ1ρr)−1ρ2
rM]Dt−1 + Uρr}. (B.6)
The E-stability condition is that all of the eigenvalues of T(A) and T(D) have real parts
less than one. I show the analytical expression of the E-stability condition in the next
section.
C Analytical expression of the E-stability conditions
C.1 The contemporaneous rule
From eqs. (9) and (10) of the main text, the rule based on contemporaneous data will be




1 σ − σFcπ[b1 +
φ1
1−φ1b2]







1 σ − σFcπ[b1 +
φ1ρr
1−φ1ρrb2]





where Δ ≡ 1/(1 + σFcy + σκFcπ). Suppose that the characteristic equation of DTA − I is
given as μ2 + m1μ + m2 = 0, where m1 = −tr(DTA − I) and m2 = det(DTA − I). As is
pointed out by Bullard and Mitra (2002), both of the eigenvalues of DTA have real parts
less than one if and only if m1 > 0 and m2 > 0. It follows that
1+σ(2Fcy +2 κFcπ − κ) − (1 + σFcy)(b1 +
φ1
1 − φ1
b2) > 0, (C.1)
κ(Fcπ − 1) + Fcy(1 − b1 −
φ1
1 − φ1
b2) > 0. (C.2)
The corresponding conditions for DTD are
1+σ(2Fcy +2 κFcπ − κ) − (1 + σFcy)(b1 +
ρrφ1
1 − ρrφ1
b2) > 0, (C.3)
κ(Fcπ − 1) + Fcy(1 − b1 −
ρrφ1
1 − ρrφ1
b2) > 0. (C.4)
We obtain the following proposition:
Proposition C.1 Assume that φ1 = αβ¯ Πθ−1 < 1 and ρr < 1. The E-stability condition
for the policy rule under the contemporaneous data is given by (C.1) and (C.2) if b2 ≥ 0,
and (C.3) and (C.4) otherwise.
16Thus, the E-stability condition under nonzero trend inﬂation is generally stipulated by
four inequalities.2 Notice that in the special case of zero trend inﬂation, where b1 = β
and b2 = 0, the E-stability condition reduces to κ(Fcπ − 1) + Fcy(1 − β) > 0. In the
generalized version, the term (1 − β) is replaced with 1 − b1 − φ1b2/(1 − φ1), which
describes the slope of the NKPC under nonzero trend inﬂation.
C.2 The forecast-based rule
DTA and DTD under the forecast-based rule are given as
DTA =

1 − σFfy σ(1 − Ffπ)







1 − σFfy σ(1 − Ffπ)





Conditions −tr(DTA − I) > 0 and det(DTA − I) > 0 lead to
σFfy + κσ(Ffπ − 1) + 1 − b1 −
φ1
1 − φ1
b2 > 0, (C.5)
κ(Ffπ − 1) + Ffy(1 − b1 −
φ1
1 − φ1
b2) > 0. (C.6)
The corresponding conditions for DTD are
σFfy + κσ(Ffπ − 1) + 1 − b1 −
ρrφ1
1 − ρrφ1
b2 > 0, (C.7)
κ(Ffπ − 1) + Ffy(1 − b1 −
ρrφ1
1 − ρrφ1
b2) > 0. (C.8)
If b2 is non-negative (negative), then the only relevant conditions are (C.5) and (C.6)
((C.7) and (C.8)). This suggests that the E-stability condition under the forecast-based
rule is generally diﬀerent from the one under the contemporaneous rule, whereas the
forecast-based rule and the contemporaneous rule share the E-stability conditions in
common under zero trend inﬂation.
Proposition C.2 Assume that φ1 = αβ¯ Πθ−1 < 1 and ρr < 1. The E-stability condition
for the policy rule under the forecast-based data is given by (C.5) and (C.6) if b2 ≥ 0, and
(C.7) and (C.8) otherwise.
C.3 The contemporaneous expectations rule
Under the contemporaneous expectations rule, DTA and DTD are given as
DTA =

1 − σFpy σ(1 − Fpπ)








1 − (σ/ρr)Fpy σ(1 − Fpπ/ρr)





It is clear that the combination of policy coeﬃcients that satisfy −tr(DTA − I) > 0 and
det(DTA − I) > 0 are exactly the same as those under the forecast-based rule:
σFpy + κσ(Fpπ − 1) + 1 − b1 −
φ1
1 − φ1
b2 > 0, (C.9)
κ(Fpπ − 1) + Fpy(1 − b1 −
φ1
1 − φ1
b2) > 0. (C.10)






















Fpy(1 − b1 −
ρrφ1
1 − ρrφ1
b2) > 0. (C.12)
If b2 ≥ 0, then condition (C.11) is redundant because the inequality always holds as long







(κFpπ +( 1− b1)Fpy) −
φ2
1(1 − ρr)
(1 − φ1)(1 − ρrφ1)
b2Fpy < 0i fb1 ≤ 1,b 2 ≥ 0,κ≥ 0.
It follows that the E-stability condition is given by (C.9) and (C.10) if b1 ≤ 1, b2 ≥ 0 and
κ ≥ 0. This suggests that the E-stability condition under the contemporaneous
expectations rule becomes exactly the same as that under the forecast-based rule. More
generally, however, any of the conditions (C.9) - (C.12) can be relevant.
Proposition C.3 Assume that φ1 = αβ¯ Πθ−1 < 1 and ρr < 1. The E-stability condition
for the policy rule based on contemporaneous expectations is given by (C.9) and (C.10) if















































































































































































































































































































Figure 7: The E-stability and determinacy regions under the contemporaneous expectations
rule: b3 > 0.
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